In this paper, we present a simple version of Fleuron's bargaining and enforcement model and show that impatience (as captured in the discount factor) can be a source of bargaining strength. The outcome of the bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners’ dilemma. Second, we illustrate how to apply this model to the question of the distribution of benefits within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons. We use empirical evidence from OPEC’s fifty year history to test the model.We find countries that discount the future more heavily tend to ask for higher oil production quotas than those that do not. Empirical evidence confirms that OPEC members who are in greater need of oil income are allowed to have higher relative quotas.

Rent-seeking is an effort that is formed between a company and its employees to obtain more profit under their tendency to rent-seeking. In this paper, the interaction between a company and its employees is studied by an unlimited multi stage Repeated Games. According to the strategies of the company and its employees (payment and punishment types for rent-seeker employee) subGame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and their payoffs are obtained based on the history of Game. Finally it will be shown that under what condition (the punishment and payment types), the employees do not choose the rent-seeking strategies and behave honestly.

Today, the many benefits of cloud computing have led many businesses, large and small, to use cloud services to reduce their costs. In the meantime, there are some barriers to using cloud services, one of the biggest of which is security attacks affected by the supervisor. When a direct attack on a user is carried out on a supervisor, it may also indirectly attack other users' virtual machines. Meanwhile, the conflicting goals and interests of cloud service users and attackers make it difficult for cloud service providers to decide to invest in cloud server security modules. Therefore, in this article, using Game theory, a suitable solution for deciding to invest in one of the security modules for each of the actors is presented. Also, using the iterative Game model, all Nash equilibria have been extracted and analyzed. The results show that Game theory can be well used in making the right decision and finding the right balance to make decisions about investing in the field of applied security. Based on the simulation results, it can be said that in repetitive Games with a probability of repeating the Game between 0. 2 and 0. 8, predetermined investment strategies or non-investment can lead to an appropriate Nash equilibrium and Pursue maximum benefits for cloud service users.

The term "Game GIS” implies to real spatially enabled Games in which a special part of the world is virtually simulated, represented and managed. In fact, Game GIS is an integrated system consists of video Games and geographical information systems, aimed to simulate and representing spatially enabled environment. The achieved result of implementing a Game GIS service can be exploited before a crisis for wise designing of a city and diminution of the aftermath casualties. As the decision making process plays the key role to reduce the losses, the need arises for using the models as much as close to the reality. By this, it is possible to use the virtual world in in the form of a Game rather than experiencing the real world with real wounded and killed persons in. This enables us to recognize and manage a test environment for promoting the managing the real environment of a city during and before a natural hazard disaster like an earthquake.  ...

Dental diseases in children have high prevalence the purpose of this study was to assess the effectiveness of oral health Game on brushing skill and plaque score of school children. A Quasi-experimental study was carried on 220 subjects randomly and sampling was done on the fourth grade's girl students. A checklist was used to measuring the brushing skill and plaque score. t. test showed that there is a significant statistical difference between two groups brushing skill (P= 0.000) and plaque score (P= 0.000). The effectiveness of oral health Game was 96.9% in brushing skill and the plaque score to 14.7%.  

Objective: The Game theory attempts to model math behavior in a strategic situation. This situation occurs when the success of one side of the Game depends on the strategies that the other party chooses. The purpose of this study is to find an optimal strategy for the interests of the parties in the Game using the Game theory approach. Methods: The present study uses managers and auditors to maximize their profits, respectively, from profit management strategies and increasing the quality of the audit (reducing the risk of uncritical discovery). The statistical population of the study is a statistical society that is accessible to all companies admitted to the stock market by imposing restrictions on the years 1391 to 1395. Hypotheses for the combined data of 116 companies (575 companies of the year) were tested using the best responder response and the Mann-Whitney test. Results: Research findings reveal the existence of “ Nash equilibrium” in the strategy of high audit quality strategy and high earning management, therefore in this strategy, neither the auditor nor the manager has the incentive to change the strategy because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy, Because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy. Conclusion: The results of the research indicate that it is important to consider the audit as a type of strategic environment. The findings of this research can help auditors in analyzing conflicts with the client and selecting the optimal strategy in the audit process.

Some social surveys address sensitive topics for which respondents do not report reliable responses. Randomized response techniques (RRTs) are employed to increase privacy levels and provide honest answers. However, estimates obtained from this method tend to exhibit increased variances. Repeating randomized responses for each individual increases the sample size, and the mean of observations for each individual reduces the variance of the parameter’s estimator, bringing them closer to reality. In this study, considering continuous additive Repeated randomized responses (RRRs), we apply the averaged RR of each individual using the linear regression model for sensitive variable mean. Data on the income of family heads were collected from students, and each respondent was asked to randomize their responses five times. The maximum likelihood estimators of parameters are obtained by two methods. In the first method, the response variable is the first reported observation, and in the second method, we considered the averaged RR for each individual. The results emphasize that the estimators from the second method are closer to reality and have lower variance.

This paper focuses on strategic trade policy in the form of export subsidies in Cournot duopoly structure for differentiated goods. Export subsidies affect social welfare in both static and dynamic situations, and the aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the welfare effects of export subsidies in one-period and multi-period Games in differentiated goods markets. To analyze the welfare effects of export subsidies, a two-stage Game of complete but inperfect information is considered. In the first stage, two governments determine the amount of export subsidies and in the second stage, two firms determine the product level. The results show that, given that the firms’ competitiveness do not differ so much, export subsidies by both governments increase the firms’ profits and decrease social welfare of both countries. In an infinitely Repeated Game with different discount factors for both countries, and by adopting trigger strategy, we create some conditions, in which both governments commit free trade. However, if the competitiveness of one firm is so greater than the other, free trade using trigger strategy is not stable and the country with more competitive firm has incentive to deviate.